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China’s geographically uneven growth plays a
key role in regional integration by creating more
varied and largely beneficial global connections.
In this article, Xiangming Chen takes a new look
at China’s key cities and how they not only drive
China’s local and regional economic growth but
also serve as bridges to link China’s varied local
economies to regional and global markets.

C

hina projects a huge and continually growing
profile and impact on the world stage. Much of
this Chinese influence globally is often anchored
to and channeled out by its key cities. Shanghai towers
over all these cities in what it stands and functions for
China, as the country’s financial and trade centre, largest
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port (also the world’s top container port), and gateway
to China’s huge domestic market. As such, Shanghai
gets a lot of attention from the global business community, especially when its stock market tumbled recently and sent shock waves around the world.
Besides Shanghai, a variety of other cities have
become more important for China, and the world
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Figure 1: Shares of
Agriculture, Industry and
Service in Shanghai's GDP
Figure 2: Shares of Low vs.
High-end Services in Shanghai

economy, for that matter. A number of these cities
are well known for their significant historic and
contemporary economic and cultural roles such as
Guangzhou and Xi’an. Other cities have risen from
unknown origins to prominent economic centres like
Shenzhen. There are also some much less known
cities that have grown into new regional hubs with
strong global connections. You most likely have not
heard about them, names like Ruili and Yiwu.
In this article I take a new look at China’s key
cities by focusing on two of their salient features.
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These cities are drivers of China’s local and regional
economic growth. They also serve as bridges to link
China’s varied local economies to regional and global
markets. I examine both roles in how they play out in
similar ways across four very different cities in scale

and other dimensions: Shanghai, Chongqing, Yiwu,
and Ruili (see their locations on Map 1).

Shanghai: Leading Nationally and Bridging
Globally and Regionally
Shanghai’s transformation has been heavily studied
over the past two decades. Yet here is another interesting way to look at how Shanghai itself has changed in
leading China’s economic growth and global integration. Compared to all major cities in China, Shanghai
has undergone the most striking and sustained shift
from manufacturing to services (see Figure 1).
During the first half of the 1984-2014 period,
Shanghai was more of a manufacturing centre as it was
built up to be during the centrally planned era from 1949
to the early 1980s. The second half from the late 1990s
saw Shanghai move steadily towards a service economy.
This trend not only puts Shanghai’s economic transition ahead of all other manufacturing-oriented cities in
China but also places Shanghai on a similar pathway like
other global cities as important service hubs.
Shanghai is indeed on track to resemble the economic profile of global cities like New York and
London (see Figure 2). As Shanghai’s service sector
as a share of GDP has surpassed manufacturing,
its high-end or producer services like finance, insurance and real estate (FIRE) have grown faster
than low-end services like retails. This shift reflects
the faster and greater concentration of international banks in Shanghai, mostly in the Pudong financial
district. More than half of the foreign-owned banks
and their branches operating in China are registered
in Shanghai. The assets of foreign banks in Shanghai
accounts for 47.3% of the foreign banks' total assets
in China. Shanghai’s banking dominance today brings
back its heyday in the early 1930s when it ranked the
world’s third banking centre, only behind New York
and London and ahead of Hong Kong and Tokyo.
As Shanghai marches (back) to its historic global city
status, it has also been leading and driving the China’s
major manufacturing cities in developing stronger services. At the same time, Shanghai plays a growing part
in bridging the global economy with the Yangtze River
Delta (YRD) region of which it has been the unquestionable hub (Figure 31). With the shedding of manufacturing functions to second-tier YRD cities like
Suzhou, with subcontracting ties to even smaller cities,
Shanghai has strengthened its position as the regional core by adding more critical and high-value-added
functions such as corporate headquarters and R&D
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Map 2: Chongqing’s “One
Circle and Two Wings”
Development Plan
Source: Chongqing
Municipal Planning Bureau.
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centres. By October 2014, Shanghai secured 484 regional headquarters of multinational corporations, of
which 24 were Asia-Pacific headquarters, 295 investment companies, and 379 R&D centres.2
Besides being China’s premier international city,
Shanghai continues to lead China’s major cities in transitioning towards a service-oriented and advanced local
economy. This has also paralleled Shanghai’s stronger
role in connecting and integrating the YRD region
with the global economy, driving forward one of the
world’s largest and most powerful regional economies.

Chongqing: Shanghai of the West
About 2,400 kilometers up the Yangtze River from
Shanghai in western China is the city of Chongqing
(Map 1). With over 30 million people in its sprawling administrative boundary, Chongqing may be “the

Being China’s political centre in the first half of
the 1940s propelled Chongqing to the largest
financial, aviation and even cultural/fashion
centre in interior China, second only to Shanghai.
36
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largest city in the world that few people know about.”
Chongqing drew some global attention in 2012 when
Bo Xilai, the then Party secretary of Chongqing
Municipality, was sacked and then imprisoned for
what the central government labeled as corruption
and other criminal activities.
If we take a much longer historical perspective,
Chongqing has always loomed large among China’s
major cities, even relative to Shanghai. Chongqing
had a small concession zone as an inland treaty port
after 1891, with a little similarity to Shanghai’s dominant treaty port status after the first Opium War in
1842. But Chongqing was hindered by its position as
a mountain city close to the headwaters of Yangtze
and languished as a distant backwater.
Chongqing was never cosmopolitan until the outbreak of the war of resisting Japan in 1937 and when
the Nationalist government moved its capital to
Chongqing in 1938. Being China’s political centre then
in the first half of the 1940s propelled Chongqing to
the largest financial, aviation and even cultural/fashion
centre in interior China, second only to Shanghai.
Chongqing after 1949 was down and up. The
uptick phase began during the Cultural Revolution.
Concerned about a potential Soviet attack, the central

government designated Chongqing as the core of the
“Third Front” for hosting the relocated heavy industries from the coast. This turned Chongqing into a
“Little Shanghai” that would lead the nation in developing defense-related machinery and ship-building industries. Chongqing ended up receiving 122
enterprises in these industries from Shanghai with a
large pool of human talent in engineering and technical professions. In spite or because of this external
transfer of resources, Chongqing neglected local advantages as the natural and potentially autonomous
hub for the upper Yangtze region in achieving a more
balanced development of housing, infrastructure and
amenities of city life.
Chongqing got a big boost in 1997 when it was elevated to the fourth central government municipality
besides Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin. It would now
cover 82,403 square kilometers and encompass a population of over 30 million. This designation brought
about a great deal more autonomy by making it function as a province, and one of the most important
ones at that, and thus setting it onto the most remarkable phase of growth and change in its long history.
Starting in 1997, the central government would
give Chongqing $240 million as low-interest loans
per year for the Three Gorges Dam-affected region,
$80 million for building new housing for displaced
residents, and refund $85 million from import taxes
to Chongqing for Dam-related projects. In addition,
Chongqing was allowed to lower enterprise tax for
new foreign investment projects from 33% to 24%,
or even to 15% if these projects were located in its
economic and technological development zones.
The launch of China’s “Go West Campaign” in
2000 moved Chongqing up another notch to finally
become the undisputed economic hub for the upper
Yangtze region, or the “dragon’s tail” relative to
Shanghai as the “dragon’s head” for the YRD. To
live up to this ambitious goal, Chongqing unveiled
the “One Circle and Two Wings” (see Map 2) master
plan in 2007. It would accelerate the pace and spread
of urbanisation and economic development from the
enlarging urban core into the two largely rural subregions. It called for converting about 10 million
rural residents of Chongqing Municipality to urban
dwellers by around 20203, through the building up of
several secondary cities like Wanzhou.
By building up the municipal and transport infrastructure in and around these secondary cities, the municipal government can scale them up and out so they

The launch of
China’s “Go
West Campaign”
in 2000 moved
Chongqing up
another notch to
finally become
the undisputed
economic hub
for the upper
Yangtze region,
or the “dragon’s
tail” relative to
Shanghai as the
“dragon’s head”
for the YRD.

are capable of accommodating more rural people and
also pushing some development impulses deeper into
the distant and poorer areas of Chongqing’s sprawling regional hinterland. If successful, this strategy will
replicate a similar regional bridging role as Shanghai.
Like Shanghai’s global connective functions but
from a less advantaged interior position, Chongqing
launched the 11,179-kilometer Trans-Eurasia Railway
from southwestern China to Duisburg, Germany,
through Kazakhstan, Russia, Belarus and Poland in
2011. In 2005, Chongqing also opened seven new international flights to Paris, Vancouver, Los Angeles,
Sidney, Melbourne, New Delhi and Mumbai, even
though they all connect through Shanghai. As labour
and land costs in coastal cities like Shanghai have
gone up, Chongqing has benefited by attracting more
foreign investors and domestic producers to move
inland. Having set up Asia’s largest laptop factory
in Chongqing, US computer giant Hewlett Packard
has already shipped more than four million notebook
computers to Europe by the Chongqing-Duisburg
railroad. This was part of the $2.5 billion worth of
goods China has shipped on this route since 2011.4

Yiwu: Relatively Small Yet Very Global
As the megacities of Shanghai and Chongqing continue to garner global attention, little remains known
about China’s much smaller cities, although more
of them have begun to play similar roles in driving
local and regional growth and in fostering beneficial
global connections. I start with the story of Yiwu.
Few people outside of China have heard about Yiwu
and how it has become one of the most globalised
cities in China today.
A small rural town of Zhejiang province in the
late 1970s and located from 300 kilometers from
Shanghai, Yiwu was an early beneficiary of China’s
initial wave of decentralisation and economic reform.
With a lot of local autonomy, the local government
steered local market and global economic forces in
jump-starting rapid urban growth through careful
planning and flexible policies. Instead of building
many factories in spatially distinctive industrial districts like Shenzhen and other coastal cities, Yiwu
chose a commercial route and charted a new path to
globalise its own local economy.
From the very outset, the local government
focused on promoting spatially centralised and specialised markets and vending booths for small merchandise such as handicraft items and hand tools.
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These commodities found home at thousands of
booths amassed in the International Trade Mart
(Yiwu Market) located in a huge mall-like structure
of 4.7 million square meters built by the local government (see Figure 4). In 1982 there were only 705
booths in this trade centre. Fast forward to 2004 the
number of booths shot up to 42,000, which are estimated to reach roughly 65,000 in 2014.
These booths display and sell 300,000 different
kinds of merchandise goods in specialised markets
for glass gifts, wooden gifts, pencils, office supplies,
jewelry, toys, radios, earphones, socks, clothes, etc.
Some refer to Yiwu as “The Socks City” because it
supplies an enormous amount of socks to the world.
In addition, 600 factories around Yiwu make about
60% of the world’s Christmas decorations.6
As small commodity booths grew in numbers
and density, they attracted hundreds of thousands
Chinese and international buyers and traders. The increase in commercial transactions spurred the expansion of small factories around the region surrounding Yiwu. These factories process and assemble more
small merchandise to be sold at and exported from
the city’s central mart. This trade-manufacturing relationship, on a much smaller scale, bears some resemblance to the dominant trading and marketing specialisation of Shanghai with backward manufacturing
ties to the YRD regional economy (see Figure 3).
The regional integration of Yiwu as a globally connected small merchandise hub has fueled the
ten-fold growth of the city’s population from 1990
to around one million today. Among the long-term
local residents are approximately 10,000 foreign businessmen from 85 countries working for over 3,000
foreign trading companies. This has earned Yiwu the
moniker as “the largest commodity wholesale market
in the world” with a market index that is widely regarded as a barometer of prices and performance.
The recent installment of the Yiwu-Madrid
Railroad further highlights Yiwu’s extensive global
economic reach. Covering 13,500 kilometers, this
railroad goes through eight different countries as the
world’s longest. It begins from Yiwu through central
China, joins the Trans-Eurasia Railway at Kazakhstan,
continues on from Germany to France, and finally
reaches Madrid. The train takes just three weeks to
complete a journey that would take up to six weeks by
sea. It is also more environmentally friendly than road
transport, which would produce 114 tonnes of CO2
to shift the same volume of cargo, compared with
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only 44 tonnes produced by the train – a 62% reduction.7 This new rail line expands Yiwu’s global trade
in small merchandise by making it easy to export its
goods all over Asia and Europe.

Figure 4: Yiwu's market has

Ruili: From a Small Border Town to a Major
Gateway to Southeast Asia

Source: http://101.69.178.21/

The last city takes us back from the coastal region to
the southwest, but all the way to the border city of
Ruili in Yunnan province (Map 1). A sleepy town on
the border with Myanmar through the 1980s, Ruili
has since grown into a key city for driving lagged
economic development in its border region and
bridging the latter with the neighbouring Southeast
Asian economies. In this process Ruili has acted a
little like Shanghai, albeit on a much smaller scale,
and in similar ways as Yiwu but with a smaller scope
of local marketing.
The collapse of the Burmese Communist Party at
the end of the 1980s was key to opening up border trade
between China and Myanmar. The city of Ruili created
the Jiagao Border Economic Development Zone in
1991 to facilitate trade with Muse on the Myanmar
side. At Ruili’s border trade market, hundreds of petty

an area of 2.6 million square
meters, accommodates
58,000 booths, selling over
400,000 plus goods.
purchaserservice/detail/
43511.html

Some refer to Yiwu as “The Socks City”
because it supplies an enormous amount of
socks to the world. Yiwu also sources 80-90%
of the world's Christmas decorations.
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traders and dealers from Myanmar, Bangladesh, India,
Nepal, Pakistan and Thailand selling cotton, jade,
bracelets, ivory items and aquatic products. The market
however is dominated by Chinese and Myanmar jade
traders who converge from local and other places in
their respective countries to make jade the central
focus of Ruili’s lively border trade.
Ruili’s importance rose much beyond a border
market in June 2010 when the city became more regionally linked to China’s strategic plan to develop
its vast western region. During 2012-2013, the
central and local governments began to execute the
“Implementation Scheme of Ruili Experimental
Zone” and the “Master Plan of Ruili Experimental
Zone” in order to build Ruili up to a regional hub.
The Master Plan included 238 projects such as industrial parks and trading centres, which would boost
Ruili as a gathering place and gateway for economic
activities and flows with the neighbouring Southeast
Asian economies including a new oil/gas pipeline
from western Myanmar into Yunnan.8
The new infrastructure investment strengthened Ruili’s role as an increasingly open land port. In
December 2013, the Ruili Experimental Zone began
issuing border passes for cross-border travel, which has
facilitated the growth of cross-border tourism, especially Chinese tourists visiting Myanmar. The Experimental
Zone also became a testing area for foreign current exchange making Ruili the first city in China to trade
Myanmar’s currency of Kyat, and also the first county-level city in Yunnan province to establish a currency exchange centre. As of June 2015, Ruili completed
hundreds of business deals amounting to over $160
million.9 The cumulative economic opportunities have
raised Ruili’s population from around 10,000 in 1990 to
over 150,000 today including temporary migrants.
Parallel to the cross-border economic boom has
been the flow of illegal or illicit activities into and
through Ruili. This is not surprising considering that
the China-Myanmar border zone is infamous for gambling, commercial sex, drugs, and arms trafficking.
Official figures show that Ruili has 7,700 people with
HIV – the second-highest prevalence incidence rate in
China behind a city in Sichuan province – and 53%
of the sufferers come from Myanmar.10 Of the approximately 40,000 people from Myanmar entering
and leaving Ruili, more than 200 are estimated to be
prostitutes, 1.6% of whom may be infected with HIV.
There are also around 30,000 people from Myanmar,
many of them belonging to the persecuted minority

group of Rohingya, living in Ruili, adding to the challenge of local governance. As part of a broader effort
to deal with drugs and prostitution and thus maintain
social stability, the local government has set up clinics
for Myanmese citizens who are infected with HIV or
who are drug addicts in Ruili including the provision
of methadone treatment (see Figure 5).
Compared to Shanghai, Chongqing and Yiwu, the
frontier city of Ruili bordering the less developed
economy of Myanmar faces a different balance of
opportunities and challenges. These however reflect
the transformation of Ruili from a local place to a
global city of sort.

Figure 3: Regionalied GlobalLocal Production and Value
Chains Into, Through, and Out

International Implications
Despite their huge differences in history and population size, these four cities have become both the driving
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Source: See Note 1.
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A multinational company owns brand names, sets product specifications, subcontracts
manufacturing and controls wholesale channels and retail markets.
Shanghai (central hub of the YRD) contributes land, some capital, skilled labour, some
production equipment, and management expertise; provides some producer services such as
accounting, insurance, legal services, custom clearance, shipping logistics and increasingly
R&D talent and outputs.
Suzhou, Kunshan, and Jiaxing (secondary cities in the YRD) contribute medium-cost land
and labour, intermediate inputs, manufacturing expertise, and also finished products to be
moved (back) to Shanghai for exports.
Wujiang, Qidu and Jiangcun (third-tier cities, fourth-tier towns, fifth-tier villages in the
YRD) contribute lowest-cost land and labour, some raw processed materials, and ships parts
and components to secondary cities for further assembling or manufacturing.
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path built on border trade unless the city can maximise its gateway position to create wider economic
ties with Southeast Asia. These uncertain and contingent conditions will continue to challenge the outside
world to better understand these cities.
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Figure 5: Drug Users from
Myanmar Collect Doses of
Methadone from a
Clinic in Ruili, Yunnan
Province, China
Source: Photo by Jiang Dong,
China Daily, July 10, 2014, p. 7.

40

force and bridging agents for their rapid growth,
gradual regional integration and increasing global influence. They are no longer local places that they once
were, although Shanghai has been global for a much
longer time. They show us why they are key cities for
China today and in the future. More importantly, these
four cities point two critical international implications.
First, to understand what is going on across
China and its extensive global impact, we need to
understand China’s key cities much better. These
cities not only continue to drive and sustain China’s
geographically uneven growth but also play a key
role in regional integration by creating more varied
and largely beneficial global connections. We can no
longer only focus on the megacities of Shanghai and
Chongqing, although their massive scale and economic power will continue to matter a lot more to
China’s and global economy than Yiwu and Ruili.
The latter cities, and many more like them, will
become more important over time as they catch
up in development and help bring forth the lagging
regions and generate more global integration.
Relative to the much larger and more diversified
cities like Shanghai and Chongqing, cities such as Yiwu
and Ruili face the more difficult choice of how to
sustain their growth and play their respective regional or global roles. The narrowly specialised economy
makes Yiwu vulnerable to the price volatility in the
global economy. Yet diversification beyond Yiwu’s
distinctive and entrenched strength is unlikely. The
border location may lock Ruili into a developmental
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